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Abstract. Cooperation based on similarity has been discussed since Richard Dawkins introduced the term
“green beard” eﬀect. In these models, individuals cooperate based on an aribtrary signal (or tag) such as
the famous green beard. Here, two diﬀerent models for such tag based cooperation are analysed. As neutral
drift is important in both models, a ﬁnite population framework is applied. The ﬁrst model, which we term
“cooperative tags” considers a situation in which groups of cooperators are formed by some joint signal.
Defectors adopting the signal and exploiting the group can lead to a breakdown of cooperation. In this
case, conditions are derived under which the average abundance of the more cooperative strategy exceeds
50%. The second model considers a situation in which individuals start defecting towards others that are
not similar to them. This situation is termed “defective tags”. It is shown that in this case, individuals
using tags to cooperate exclusively with their own kind dominate over unconditional cooperators.
PACS. 02.50.Le Decision theory and game theory – 87.23.-n Ecology and evolution
Dawkins introduced the term “green beard” eﬀect to de-
scribe an earlier thought experiment in sociobiology by
Hamilton: a gene that leads to a tag visible to other in-
dividuals (such as the famous green beard) and also to
the tendency to help others with the same tag can quickly
spread and lead to cooperation based on these tags [1–4].
For a long time, it seemed to be diﬃcult to accept the idea
that a single gene leads to a tag and a change in behav-
ior towards others with this tag. However, several experi-
ments have reported green beard eﬀects in biology [5–8]. If
the tag and the change in behavior cannot be untangled,
there is no room for cheaters: no individual can fake the
signal which serves cooperators to identify each other.
Usually, green beards serve as an example how things
cannot work. If tag and behavior evolve independently,
this allows cheaters to undermine the system. Individuals
with a certain tag that do not help others will enjoy the
support of others, but not return this support. Hence, they
will spread in the system and cooperation will diminish.
Although this rules out the idea of long-term cooperation
based on this mechanism, it has been shown that such
mechanisms can lead to cooperation for a limited amount
of time, depending on the costs and beneﬁts of cooperation
and the number of available tags. In this case cooperation
evolves only under rather restrictive conditions [9,10].
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In social systems, the gene centered view does not nec-
essarily hold and thus, the results from these models can
be quite diﬀerent. In this case, a strategy can be deﬁned
as a combination of tag and behavior towards others. Such
tags signal certain properties to others. For example, ac-
cents make it easy to recognize others with the same native
language, which can lead to support due to communica-
tion. Fads are another example in which there is a cost
associated with the admission into a group by buying a
certain product. Every member of this group then sup-
ports the group identity.
In the presence of cheaters, tag-based cooperation can
evolve, e.g. when the formation of groups is made pos-
sible by spatial structure which helps to establish coop-
eration [11]. Another possibility is the formation of co-
operative tag groups in a mixed population for a limited
amount of time [10,12]. It has also been proposed that
such tag-based cooperation is an important mechanism in
the formation and maintenance of peer-to-peer computer
networks [13,14].
Here, diﬀerent mechanisms that have been introduced
to explain cooperation based on similarity are com-
pared. In particular, the mechanisms introduced by Riolo
et al. [15] and Jansen and van Baalen [16] are the basis for
the comparison. To this end, we develop minimal models
which allow an analytical comparison in a ﬁnite popula-
tion framework. Finite populations are essential here, as
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they allow neutral drift, which often has an important in-
ﬂuence on the dynamics.
We consider only a ﬁnite number of tags, K, which
can be viewed as the number of beard colours available.
In the model motivated by the mechanism of Jansen and
van Baalen [16], we have the strategies “always defect” D
and “intragroup cooperation” I, which corresponds to the
“ethnocentric” strategy of Axelrod et al. [11,17]. D indi-
viduals have a ﬁxed tag, but do not cooperate. Individ-
uals of type I cooperate only with others that have the
same tag as themselves. We have hence 2K diﬀerent types
of individuals in total. Riolo et al. [15] introduced their
model with tags and strategies given by real numbers. In
this sense, the number of possible strategies is inﬁnite.
However, it has been shown that the general dynamics of
this model can be captured by a simple toy model based
on the replicator dynamics [18], which considers only two
tags and two strategies [12]. Here, this model is gener-
alised to K tags. For this model, the strategies are “always
cooperate” C and “intragroup cooperation” I. Uncondi-
tional cooperators C cooperate with everyone, regardless
of the tags. Again, the number of diﬀerent individual types
is 2K. In the following, we use a lower index to denote the
tag of an individual, e.g. Di is a defector with tag i.
Population dynamics is modelled in ﬁnite populations,
including the eﬀects of mutation and random drift. We
consider a well mixed population with no spatial struc-
ture, as it is well known that spatial structure itself can
lead to cooperation [1,19–23]. We apply the pairwise com-
parison process discussed in [21,24–26], which for weak
selection is equivalent to the frequency dependent Moran
process [27–29]. The ﬁxation probabilities of this process
are identical to a Moran process with exponential mapping
from payoﬀs to ﬁtness [30]. Following [31,32], we assume
that there is a small probability μ that an error occurs
and an individual switches to a random strategy, which
might not be present in the population yet. In general,
the state space of the system is the discretized simplex
S2K = {(l1, . . . , l2K) ∈ N2K0 :
∑2K
k=1 lk = N}, where lk is
the number of individuals of type k and N is the popula-
tion size. However, because μ is small, the system spends
most time at the corners of the simplex. Occasionally, ﬁx-
ation of mutants leads from one corner to another one.
The interior of the simplex is only reached when a second
error occurs while the system moves along the edge of the
simplex. Hence, the full Markov process can be approxi-
mated by the embedded Markov chain on the corners of
the simplex if the typical time τμ = 1/μ between two mu-
tations is much greater than the ﬁxation time in which
the system moves along the edge. For neutral selection,
this time is N(N − 1). The frequency dependent selec-
tion in our system decreases this time [26,29]. Since the
systems analysed here show no stable coexistence of two
or more strategies, the maximum ﬁxation time is found in
the neutral case. Hence, we only have to ensure μ N−2.
The probability of switching from one strategy to another
under frequency dependent selection is derived in the Ap-
pendix. The system has a symmetry between the diﬀerent
tags - exchanging the color of two beards cannot change
the dynamics of the system. Since we are interested only
in the probability that the system is in one of the C, I,
or D states (regardless of the tag), we only have to con-
sider the transitions between strategies and can disregard
transitions between tags without a change in the strategy.
This reduces the number of types from 2K to 2 and allows
computation of the stationary fraction of both strategies
analytically for weak selection.
First, we analyze a model with cooperative tags. This
yields a condition under which circumstances intragroup
cooperators dominate over defectors in the population.
Then, we turn to defective tags. We show that indepen-
dent of the number of tags, the strategy using tags always
dominates. Finally, the combination of all strategies is dis-
cussed.
1 Cooperative tags
Let us ﬁrst consider a minimal model motivated by the
mechanism discussed by Jansen and van Baalen [16]. In
this model, individuals defect towards others with diﬀer-
ent tags. Cooperative individuals cooperate only with oth-
ers with an identical tag. Since tags are used to estab-
lish cooperation in a population of defectors, this model is
termed “cooperative tags”. There are only two strategies,
D Always defect.
I Cooperate with others that are from your own group.
Besides a strategy, each individual has one out of K dif-
ferent tags, denoted by a lower index. In the presence of
Ii individuals, Di individuals are advantageous over Ii.
But if there are no Di individuals, Ii individuals are ad-
vantageous compared to other types of defectors (Dj with
i = j) as soon as there are at least two Ii individuals. This
leads to a coupled dynamics of tags and strategies, see Fig-
ure 1a. Typically, a defecting population is replaced by a
group with a diﬀerent tag that cooperates. This group is
later exploited by defectors of the same tag, leading to
a defecting population with a diﬀerent tag. These cycles
can also be observed in simulations of unstructured pop-
ulations, see Figure 2a.
The payoﬀ matrix of a system with two diﬀerent tags i




Ii Di Ij Dj
Ii b− c −c 0 0
Di b 0 0 0
Ij 0 0 b− c −c




Here, b is the beneﬁt from cooperation and c < b is the cost
for cooperation. The payoﬀ matrix describes a Prisoner’s
Dilemma in a population of one tag only. If several tags
are available, the dilemma can be resolved, as new tags
provide niches where cooperation can thrive until cooper-
ators are exploited by defectors with the same tag again.
In the following, we derive a condition which relates the
beneﬁts and costs to the number of available tags, stating
under which conditions cooperation will dominate.

















Fig. 1. Mechanisms for similarity based cooperation in ﬁnite populations. (a) In the cooperative tag mechanism, a defecting
population with tag j can be invaded by intragroup cooperators of tag i. The ﬁrst of these mutants is neutral. Then intragroup
cooperation become advantageous. As soon as defecting individuals of the same tag appear, they can take over the population
and the cycle continues. (b) Defective tag mechanism. A population of unconditional cooperators is invaded and taken over
by intragroup cooperators of a diﬀerent tag. These intragroup cooperators are supported by the whole population, but do not
return this support. Neutral drift can transform these into unconditional cooperators again.
Let us ﬁrst consider the transition from defectors to in-
tragroup cooperators. A Di population can be invaded by
disadvantageous Ii individuals. Mutants of this type are
produced at rate μ/(2K), as only one out of 2K possible
types has a speciﬁc tag and a speciﬁc strategy. The payoﬀ
of l such Ii individuals is πI(l) = (b− c)(l− 1)/(N − 1)−
c(N−l)/(N−1). The remaining N−l Di individuals have
a higher payoﬀ, πD(l) = b l/(N − 1). For weak selection,
where strategy update depends only weakly on the payoﬀs
and is close to a random process, β  1, the probability













The generalisation to larger β is straightforward, but does
not lead to equations that are easy to interpret (see Ap-
pendix). A Di population can also be invaded by an Ij
individual (i = j). These individuals are advantageous
as soon as there are two of them. They are produced at
rate μ(K − 1)/(2K), as there are K − 1 available Ij types
out of total number of 2K. The payoﬀ of l Ij invaders is
given by πI(l) = (b−c)(l−1)/(N−1). Defecting residents
have a vanishing payoﬀ, πD(l) = 0. Note that for l = 1,
both payoﬀs are identical. Thus, a single Ij individual in
a population of Di is neutral. A second individual of this
kind can only be produced by random drift. But as soon
as there are two individuals of type Ij , they are advanta-














The combined rate of these processes, ρD→I =
μ 12K φDi→Ii + μ
K−1



















Let us now calculate the rate of the opposite transitions
from I to D. An Ii population can be exploited and in-
vaded by advantageous Di individuals. Mutants of this
type are produced at rate μ/(2K). The payoﬀs are in
the case of l Di invaders πD(l) = b(N − l)/(N − 1) and
πI(l) = −c l/(N − 1)+ (b− c)(N − l− 1)/(N − 1). Hence,













The Ii population can also be invaded by Dj individ-
uals, which are disadvantageous as they cannot exploit
the cooperating Ii individuals. Such individuals are pro-
duced at rate μ(K − 1)/(2K). The payoﬀs are πI(l) =













The combined rate of the processes transforming an I
population into a D population, ρI→D = μ 12K φIi→Di +




















In equilibrium, the probability of being in the I state, PI ,
has to fulﬁll PIρI→D = (1−PI)ρD→I . For weak selection,
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Fig. 2. Population dynamics for similarity based cooperation in ﬁnite populations. (a) Cooperative tag mechanism with two
tags (K = 2), red and blue. A red defector population can be invaded by a blue intratag cooperator population, which builds
a self-serving clique (between T = 15 000 and T = 20 000). This kind of cooperation is vulnerable to defectors of the same
tag, which invade at T ≈ 40 000, destroying this kind of cooperation. Typically, tags change when the population is defecting.
On average, the less cooperative strategy, allways defect, dominates. (b) Defective tag mechanism. A group of red intragroup
cooperators is transformed to unconditional red cooperators by random drift (T ≈ 8000). These are vulnerable to blue intratag
cooperators, which invade at T ≈ 20 000. Typically, tags change when most individuals are unconditional cooperators. Although
most individuals usually cooperate, the less cooperative strategy (intratag cooperation) dominates (population size N = 100,
intensity of selection β = 0.5, cost of cooperation c = 0.5, beneﬁt from cooperation b = 1.0, mutation rate μ = 2× 10−3).
this equation results in








This is in good agreement with simulations of the pro-
cess. In Figure 3a, the dependence on the intensity of
selection β is shown in comparison with simulations of
the process, providing a generalization for strong selec-
tion. From equation (8), we can derive a simple condition
under which intragroup cooperators dominate the popu-
lation, i.e. have an average abundance above 50%. This





b− c . (9)
Since N is usually large, the population size has a small
inﬂuence only. If the cooperation game is very eﬃcient,
b  c, only a few tags are required for I individuals to
dominate. However, if costs and beneﬁt are very similar,
b ≈ c, many diﬀerent tags are needed in order to reach
dominance of I individuals. Alternatively, condition (9)






≈ K + 1
K − 1 . (10)
The approximation is valid for N  1. For K = 1, this
mechanism does not work, as no niches for cooperators
are available. In the worst case of two tags, K = 2, (which
only works for N > 4), the beneﬁt to cost ratio for which
intragroup cooperators still dominate is 3 for large pop-
ulations. For large populations, b/c converges to 1 for
K → ∞, i.e. when enough tags are available, coopera-
tion is always observed. This results from the fact that a
cooperating population can only be exploited by a single
type of mutants, while a defecting population can be in-
vaded by K − 1 types of intragroup cooperators. In [10],
this has been termed “altruistic freedom”. If mutants with
the same tag are produced more frequently, this has to be
reﬂected in equations (4) and (7) and the critical cost to
beneﬁt ratio will be diﬀerent.
With increasing intensity of selection β, a complex de-
pendence of the abundance of the two strategies can be
A. Traulsen: Mechanisms for similarity based cooperation 367
Fig. 3. The abundance of the diﬀerent strategies in the two mechanisms can be computed from the transition probabilities
between the two states alone. Here, the dependence on the intensity of selection β is shown. Symbols are computer simulations
and lines give the theoretical result derived from equation (30). For small error probability (μ = 10−3, ﬁlled symbols), simulations
and the theoretical result agree very well. The weak selection approximation is valid if the intensity of selection is below 0.1,
where it basically coincides with the lines. (a) Cooperative tag mechanism with ﬁve tags. Since the chosen parameters fulﬁl the
condition (9), intragroup cooperators I dominate for small intensity of selection, β  1. The maximum abundance of strategy I
is observed at β ≈ 0.5. With increasing intensity of selection, a complex change in the stationary distribution is observed. When
errors are more frequent (μ = 0.1, open symbols), the theoretical prediction becomes misleading for high intensity of selection,
as always defect dominates here. (b) Defective tag mechanism with K = 5 tags. For all intensities of selection β, the less
cooperative intragroup cooperators I dominate the population. For μ = 0.1 (open symbols), the theoretical result deviates from
the simulations, but still gives a qualitative estimate (Parameters: population size N = 20, K = 5, cost of cooperation c = 0.2,
beneﬁt from cooperation b = 1.0, averages over 109 time steps).
observed. The result for weak selection can be mislead-
ing, as the picture can be diﬀerent for strong selection.
For example, in a system with the parameters N = 20,
K = 5, c = 0.2, and b = 1.0, condition (9) predicts that
strategy I dominates the system. With increasing β, the
abundance of the I strategies, xI , increases, as expected.
However, xI reaches a maximum for β ≈ 0.5 at xI ≈ 0.75,
see Figure 3a. Then, it decreases until β ≈ 8, where the
abundance of strategy (I) reaches xI ≈ 0.59. Finally, it
increases again until it reaches a constant value xI = 0.67
for β → ∞. This complex behavior arises from the
interplay of the four frequency dependent transitions that
enter into the stationary distribution.
We can also introduce a parameter s which measures
the ratio of two mutation rates. At rate μ, only the strat-
egy changes. At rate μs, tags and strategies change si-
multaneously. For s  1, tag and strategy mutations are
independent. For s 1, they are strongly coupled. Incor-




(K − 1)s + 2N−2N−2
(K − 1)s− 2N−2
. (11)
given that (K−1)s−2/(N − 2) > 0. Otherwise, the oppo-
site relation is valid. For s = 1, we recover equation (10).
For s  1, this condition reduces to b > c and is al-
ways fulﬁlled. The situation corresponds to a single gene
greenbeard eﬀect. For s → 0, the relevant condition is
b/c < 1 − N < 0, which is never fulﬁlled. The situation
corresponds to a greenbeard eﬀect caused by two indepen-
dent genes, which would not lead to cooperation.
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2 Defective tags
In the model of Riolo et al., individuals always cooperate
with others that are suﬃciently similar to them [15]. Since
they have no possibility of denying help if others similar
to themselves are present, real defectors that never coop-
erate with anyone are absent [33]. The driving force be-
hind the population dynamics can be easily understood if
a minimalist model is considered [12], see. Figure 1b. In
contrast to [12], here a ﬁnite population with more than
two tags is analyzed. We term the model “defective tags”,
as a tag is not used to establish cooperation in a popula-
tion of defectors, but rather to found a self-serving group
of cooperators that do not help others. As in the analysis
above, we consider K diﬀerent tags and two strategies.
The two strategies are
C Always cooperate
I Cooperate with others that are from your own group
As for the cooperative tag model, it is instructive to write
down a payoﬀ matrix for the interaction of the two strate-




Ci Ii Cj Ij
Ci b− c b− c b− c −c
Ii b− c b− c b 0
Cj b− c −c b− c b− c




For K tags, the payoﬀ matrix has dimension 2K × 2K.
Again, we consider population dynamics in a ﬁnite popu-
lation as described in the Appendix. Typically, a popula-
tion of unconditional cooperators is invaded by intragroup
cooperators of a diﬀerent tag. These are then again trans-
formed to unconditional cooperators, see Figure 2b. In an
inﬁnite population, this process has been modeled by an
external drift from intolerant to tolerant strategies [12].
In ﬁnite populations, such an external extension of the se-
lection dynamics is no longer necessary, as random drift
is naturally incorporated in this process, see Figures 1b
and 2b. The symmetry between tags allows us to compute
the stationary fraction of both strategies by taking into ac-
count only transitions that change the strategy, but leave
the tag unchanged. First, we compute the rate in which
the population is transformed from unconditional cooper-
ation to intragroup cooperation. A Ci population can be
replaced by an Ii population. Such a transition is neutral
and a single mutant ﬁxates with probability 1/N . Mu-
tants of this type are produced at rate μ/(2K), leading
to a transition rate φCi→Ii = u/(2KN). A Ci population
can also be invaded by an Ij individual, which is advanta-
geous in this case. Individuals of such type appear at rate
μ(K−1)/(2K). If there are l individuals of this type, their
payoﬀ is πI(l) = (b− c)(l−1)/(N−1)+ b(N− l)/(N−1).
The remaining N − l Ci individuals have a smaller payoﬀ,
πC(l) = −cl/(N − 1)+ (b− c)(N − l− 1)/(N − 1). Hence,
the probability that a single Ij individual takes over a Ci













The combined rate of the processes leading from C to I,
ρC→I = μ 12K φCi→Ii + μ
K−1

















Now we turn to the processes in which the population
switches from I to C. First, an Ii population can be re-
placed by a Ci population. This transition is neutral and
a single mutant ﬁxates with probability 1/N . Mutants
of this type are produced at rate μ/(2K), leading to a
transition rate φIi→Ci = μ/(2KN). Second, the Ii pop-
ulation can also be invaded by a Cj individual, which is
disadvantageous. Individuals of such type appear at rate
μ(K − 1)/(2K). If there are l Cj individuals, their pay-
oﬀ is πC(l) = (b − c)(l − 1)/(N − 1)− c(N − l)/(N − 1).
The remaining N − l Ii individuals have payoﬀ πI(l) =
b l/(N − 1) + (b− c)(N − l− 1)/(N − 1) each. Hence, the





























From the transition rates, we can again compute the equi-
librium distribution of the system For the probability
that the system is in the C state, we have PCρC→I =
(1− PC)ρI→C . Finally, we ﬁnd for weak selection











We have PC < 1/2, i.e. unconditional cooperators never
dominate the system and the system spends most time in
I states. This holds also for stronger selection, when non-
linear terms in β are taken into account: see Figure 3b.
The explanation for this is simple: The C → I transition
is advantageous, whereas the I → C transition is disad-
vantageous. The more tags are present, the smaller the
number of cooperators in equilibrium. However, this eﬀect
is small and does not lead to any qualitative diﬀerences,
in contrast to the cooperative tag model (see above).
If tag and strategy are controlled by a single gene and
cannot change independently, the up-down transitions in
Figure 1b that drive the cyclic dominance are not possible
and the dynamics of the system will be diﬀerent. If the si-
multaneous change of tag and strategy occurs with a very
small probability, the left-right transitions in Figure 1b
occur with a very small probability, which changes the
cyclic dominance. There is no qualitative change incorpo-
rating diﬀerent mutation rates modeled by a parameter s
here. The only possible way to increase the fraction of
cooperators is to weaken the transition from C to I, i.e.
reduce s. However, in this case neutral drift between the
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two strategies dominates and the fraction of cooperators
remains below 50%.
In the cooperative tag model, a higher number of tags
increases the abundance of the more cooperative strategy
for weak selection. In contrast, in the defective tag model,
a higher number of tags decreases the abundance of un-
conditional cooperators.
3 Combination of all three strategies
We can also combine all three strategies, unconditional co-
operators C, intragroup cooperators I and unconditional
defectors D. In this case, the 6 × 6 payoﬀ matrix for two








Ci Ii Di Cj Ij Dj
Ci b− c b− c −c b− c −c −c
Ii b− c b− c −c b 0 0
Di b b 0 b 0 0
Cj b− c −c −c b− c b− c −c
Ij b 0 0 b− c b− c −c









Now we have 3K diﬀerent types in total. Again, we can
calculate the transition probabilities between the diﬀerent
states. In addition, we have to calculate the transition
rates from C to D and vice versa, which can be done
using the calculation in the Appendix. Primed transition
rates ρ′ indicate that we are considering the 3K-strategy
































































































From these transition rates, we can construct a transi-
tion matrix between the three diﬀerent strategies, see
e.g. [31,32]. The largest eigenvector (which has eigen-
value 1, as the transition matrix is stochastic) gives the
stationary distribution. For weak selection and large pop-








































−b− 3c + b+cK
+2b− 2 b+cK








For a large number of tags, K  1, these equations are
easy to interpret. The abundance of unconditional coop-
erators C is always smaller than 1/3, which is the neutral
case. Intragroup cooperators, I, are present more than in
the neutral case. Moreover, since 2b > −b+3c due to b > c,
there are always more intragroup cooperators than defec-
tors. For unconditional defectors D, the beneﬁt to cost ra-
tio is important: for b/c < 3, their abundance exceeds 1/3,
for b/c > 3 it is below 1/3. Of course, for ﬁnite K (and
smaller N) the conditions become more intricate.
Thus, the intragroup cooperators are successful under
weak selection even if both unconditional defectors and
unconditional cooperators are present. The combination
of the three strategies has also been analyzed by Masuda
and Ohtsuki in a setting where tags are not always ob-
servable [34].
4 Discussion
In structured populations, i.e. on spatial lattices or social
networks, the dynamics of tag based system can be quite
diﬀerent. In all cases, strong segregation between diﬀerent
tags is observed [11,16,35,36].
The analytical results derived here are based on weak
selection. The generalisation to higher intensities of selec-
tion is possible with the methods given in the Appendix,
but does not lead to equations that are easy to interpret.
Throughout this paper, it has been assumed that errors
always lead to a random strategy. The picture changes if
we assume that errors only change the tag or the strategy
of an individual. In this case, for the cooperative tag mech-
anism the transition from D to I would require two inde-
pendent errors and the system would spend more time in
the D state. In the defective tag model, the system spends
more time in the C state, as the transition to I requires
two independent errors. However, alterations in the tran-
sition rates of the model can easily been done based on
the framework introduced here.
Finally, which mechanism for similarity based cooper-
ation is more likely to occur in reality? The defective tag
model describes a mechanism in which tags indicate the
action of an individual, i.e. I can predict the behavior of an
individual based on its tag. Two individuals with the same
tag will always cooperate with each other. This framework
seems to be correct if the tag and the behaviour are tightly
linked and cheating is not possible [6,7]. Another possibil-
ity for excluding cheaters that fake a certain tag are fads
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in which the tag itself is costly, e.g. ownership of a certain
car or MP3-player.
Whenever cheating is possible, the cooperative tag
framework is more appropriate. In this case, unconditional
cooperators can often be excluded from the beginning, as
they are dominated by intragroup cooperators. Even in
the presence of cheaters, cooperation based on tags can
evolve for a limited amount of time, until the ﬁrst cheater
leads to a decay of cooperation again. Since cheaters do
not enjoy the beneﬁts of cooperation, new cooperative
groups will form again and again [37].
When all three strategies are combined, then intra-
group cooperaters dominate under weak selection. For suf-
ﬁciently high beneﬁt to cost ratios, the presence of this
strategy can even lead to a situation in which there are
fewer defectors than in the neutral case.
The mechanisms for tag based cooperation discussed
here show oscillations in the cooperative behavior, as co-
operation based on similarity is unstable and can always
be exploited. These “Tides of Tolerance” [38] are a char-
acteristic feature of similarity based cooperation.
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Appendix A: Finite population framework
The payoﬀs are described above. Individuals adopt new
strategies employing the mechanism described in [25]. A
randomly chosen focal individual with payoﬀ πf compares
its payoﬀ to a second random individual with payoﬀ πc.
The focal individual switches its strategy to the one of





The intensity of selection is given by β. For β  1, se-
lection is strong and only more successful strategies are
adopted. For β  1, selection is weak. In this case, the pro-
cess coincides with the frequency dependent Moran pro-
cess under weak selection [27]. With a small propability
μ 1, an individual tries an entirely new strategy which
is possibly not present in the population yet. Since these
errors are rare, there is usually only one strategy present
in the population (the error rate has to be much smaller
than the inverse ﬁxation time of a newly introduced strat-
egy). Only occasionally, an error occurs and the newly
introduced strategy can take over the population. Con-
sider a situation with l individuals of type A and N − l
individuals of type B. The payoﬀ of the A individuals is
πA(l) = a
l − 1
N − 1 + b
N − l




N − 1 + d
N − l − 1
N − 1 · (28)
The probability that the number of A individuals changes









The probability that a single individual of type A takes












For large β, the ﬁxation probabilities can be computed
from this formula or from a closed expression that is an
excellent approximation for this formula [25,26]. However,
here we concentrate on weak selection, β  1, where the













This result is identical to the corresponding result of the
frequency dependent Moran process [27]. The results for
stronger selection shown in Figure 3 and discussed in the
text are derived from equation (30) without this simpliﬁ-
cation.
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